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CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON FDI: ANALYSING THE INTERACTION 
BETWEEN THE CORRUPTION LEVELS OF THE HOME AND HOST COUNTRIES 
AND ITS EFFECTS AT THE DECISION-MAKING LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study furthers our understanding of how corruption affects the decision-making process of 
allocating foreign direct investment (FDI). Drawing on the responses of 28 managers in charge of 
establishing operations in a highly corrupt host country, we argue that those firms based in home 
countries with low levels of corruption are more proactive in preparing to face corruption abroad 
than those based in countries with high corruption levels. This means that firms from less corrupt 
home countries have strategies in place to deal with high corruption abroad. This finding is based 
on the fact that these firms have stronger pressures to not engage in corruption from their home 
stakeholders. Also, these firms might not have the experience of dealing with corruption at home, 
which hinders their potential to deal with corruption abroad. On the other hand, those firms based 
in highly corrupt home countries do not have clear strategies to deal with corruption abroad. This 
assertion is based on the fact that these firms might have familiarity in dealing with corruption and 
thus, might not see it as an obstacle to operating abroad. 
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Introduction 
Corruption, defined as the abuse of public power for personal gain (Collins, et al., 2008), 
is an important problem that affects all countries (Petrou & Thanos, 2014). The issue of corruption 
has been intensified by the fall of barriers to commerce, since firms that were not used to dealing 
with high corruption levels at home might be encountering them abroad. Corruption exists at some 
degree in all countries; however, it is more prevalent in developing ones (Hellman, et al., 2000). 
Accordingly, all firms deciding to start operations abroad should take the level of corruption of the 
host country into account when developing their strategies for internationalisation, especially if 
such location is considered developing. However, despite the fact that current literature 
acknowledges that the effects of corruption on businesses is very important (Collins, et al., 2008), 
most studies analysing how corruption affects the allocation of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
a highly corrupt host country have focused on whether or not corruption deters FDI inflows (i.e. 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Doh, et al., 2003; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002)), without paying enough 
attention to how the decision-making process of FDI allocation at the firm level is affected by high 
levels of corruption. Therefore, this study takes into account the heterogeneity of the home country 
of multinationals and sheds light in this regard by proposing a framework that illustrates the 
decision-making process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location depending on the 
level of corruption of the home country compared to the corruption level of the host location. 
Until recently, very few studies had actually analysed how firms took corruption into 
consideration when deciding to invest in a highly corrupt foreign location (Rodriguez, et al., 2005). 
To close this gap in the literature Goodspeed et al., (2011) analysed FDI flows to developing and 
developed countries, concluding that the uncertainty generated by the level of corruption of the 
host country has a direct negative effect on firms investing in the former but not the latter. 
Furthering this line of research, Goodspeed et al., (2013) proposed that the main deterrent of FDI 
in a developing country is the level of uncertainty created by corruption as opposed to high 
taxation. Nevertheless, these studies have mainly focused on if the level of corruption of the host 
country affects the attraction of FDI rather than how. 
Addressing this dearth of research is important, because even though many businesses 
declare that corruption affects them negatively, they still engage in it. Building on the premise that 
not all foreign investors perceive and react to corruption in the same manner, (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; Goodspeed, et al., 2013), we propose that foreign investors craft strategies differently 
depending on the level of corruption of their home country as compared to that of the host country. 
To do so, we follow Godinez and Liu (2015) and divide foreign investors in two categories: those 
based in home countries with lower corruption levels than the host country and those based in 
countries with higher corruption levels. The rationale for this categorisation is to understand 
whether those foreign investors familiar with dealing with corruption at home react differently to 
corruption abroad than those investors without such experience. In this sense, we argue that those 
firms headquartered in home countries with low corruption levels will have in place a plan to deal 
with corruption abroad. This is justified because of their need to be perceived ethically in their 
home country, as well as the lack of experience in operating in highly corrupt locations. On the 
other hand, those firms headquartered in home countries with high levels of corruption do not 
devise plans to deal with corruption abroad because they might not see this phenomenon as an 
impediment for conducting operations. The next section of the study presents a literature review 
on corruption and FDI, followed by the methodology, results and discussion, and conclusions.  
Literature Review 
Corruption 
To study corruption one has to define it first. For this study we define corruption as the 
abuse of public power for personal gain (Collins, et al., 2008).  Even though many other definitions 
have been used in different studies (see Judge, et al., (2011)). This definition is appropriate for our 
study since it encompasses transactional and institutional activities between governments and 
private individuals. From this definition, scholars have identified two kinds of corruption: public 
and organisational. Public corruption is the abuse of public power for personal gain (Luiz & 
Stewart, 2014). Organisational corruption is the conscious violation of legal rules of the 
organisation for personal gain, possibly at the organisation’s detriment (Hodgson & Jiang, 2007). 
While corruption can occur exclusively in the private sector, analysing this phenomenon is beyond 
the scope of our study. Also, we focus on public corruption since the private sector should be 
regulated by the public sector of any given location. Therefore, if the public sector is highly 
corrupt, we can assume that the private sector can also be experiencing a very similar condition. 
Corruption has its roots in the economic and institutional conditions of a nation (Ufere, et 
al., 2010) and reflects the legal, political, economic, and cultural institutions of a country 
(Svensson, 2005). Corruption thrives on a weak institutional system (Rose-Ackerman & Coolidge, 
1997). This means that even though corruption is an important problem in any society, regardless 
of their development level (Collins, et al., 2008), this problem is more prevalent in developing 
countries (Powpaka, 2002) since they are characterised by challenging institutional environments 
that include low standards of living, weak administration capacity, underdeveloped industrial base, 
and low Human Development Indices (HDI) (Collins, et al., 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 
Pajunen, 2008; United Nations, 2014). Therefore, when analysing how firms react and implement 
strategies to operate in foreign locations characterised by high levels of corruption, emerging 
markets can be considered the obvious setting.  
Effects of Corruption  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) state that if bureaucrats are self-interested and have 
monopolistic powers to manage public properties they might exploit such powers for personal 
benefit to the detriment of public interests. Therefore, corruption is believed to have negative 
effects on economic growth since it allows the misallocation of productive resources, leading to 
sub-optimal growth rates (Halkos & Tzeremes, 2010). Jain (2001) argues that corruption violates 
a country’s legislation, which undermines a nation’s sovereignty. Corruption also has direct effects 
on firms since it may act as a tax, even though participating in more distortionary and costly corrupt 
activities may cause higher transaction costs than taxes (Besley & McLaren, 1993; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993). The idea of corruption increasing costs more than taxes is developed by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) who argue that firms engaging in corrupt deals should devote human and 
financial resources to manage corruption, and that these resources could have been used more 
productively in other activities. 
In addition to rising costs, high corruption in a given location also increases uncertainty, 
especially for businesses expanding their operations internationally (Curevo-Cazurra, 2008). The 
result of the uncertainty generated by corruption may include a reduction on FDI, or a reduction 
in the quality of such investment. For example, Wei (1997) argued that corruption in a host country 
would negatively affect FDI despite government policies to prevent this from happening. 
Lambsdorff (1998) concluded that corruption had a negative impact on FDI flows to developing 
nations due to the difficulty of navigating their institutional environment. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) 
argued that foreign investors from countries who signed the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Transactions were also deterred by corruption 
abroad. Goodspeed et al., (2013) investigated the relationship between corruption, taxes, and FDI 
concluding that taxes and corruption are substitutes and that the impact of taxes on FDI will be 
lessened when corruption is higher. Since corruption tends to be more prevalent and tax 
administration weaker in developing countries, so the level of development of the host country has 
a direct effect on FDI flows to such location.  On the other hand, Goodspeed et al., (2013) point 
out that if the host country is considered developed, corporate taxes are an important predictor for 
the attraction of FDI, but not the level of corruption because of the stability provided by the 
institutional environment in those countries. 
   Recent scholarship has attempted to shed light on this topic by arguing that the level of 
corruption of the home and host country should be taken into consideration when studying how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI. In this regard, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) demonstrated 
that it was not only corruption what might negatively affect the attraction of FDI but the distance 
in corruption levels between home and host countries. Building on this premise, Godinez and Liu 
(2015) proposed that what deters FDI is not the level of corruption of the host country but the 
uncertainty created by the distance and direction of corruption levels between the home and host 
countries. The authors argued that the more distance between a home country with lower 
corruption levels than the host country, the more FDI will be negatively affected. On the other 
hand, if such distance is between a home country with higher corruption levels than an already 
highly corrupt host country, the corruption distance between these two countries does not affect 
the attraction of FDI. 
Despite the wealth of studies analysing how corruption might affect the allocation of FDI, 
this subject is still not yet well understood. Even though the topic has remained popular in the 
management research agenda, this problem is elusive to study due to its secretive nature. Another 
reason why corruption and its effects on FDI are not yet fully understood may be because of the 
macroeconomic method usually employed to analyse this phenomenon. According to Yackee 
(2010), generally, research analysing corruption and its effects on FDI share a similar design. Such 
design includes an independent variable comprised by an index measuring the perception of 
corruption. Then, this independent variable is regressed against data measuring country-level FDI 
flows. Regrettably, Yackee (2010) points out that the results of these complex statistical 
methodologies are inconsistent due to their dependence on secondary data. Therefore, the return 
to the less cutting-edge, but probably more informative methodologies of interviews and surveys 
is advised to analyse this phenomenon. 
Firms Responses to Corruption 
Even though most studies analyse how corruption affects the decision-making process of 
allocating FDI to a foreign location at the macroeconomic level, there are others looking at this 
phenomenon from the firm-level perspective. For instance, Collins et al. (2008, p. 101) 
demonstrated that “the personal relationships of top managers with public officials are significant 
predictors of engagement in corruption.”  These authors also argued that support of political 
activities, from top managers, have a strong relationship with the willingness of such managers to 
engage in corrupt activities. Luiz and Stewart (2014) also studied how firms reacted to corruption 
when investing abroad and proposed that managers think of themselves as “institution takers” and 
that they only respond to the institutional conditions of the foreign locations. Nonetheless, the 
authors prove that firms can actually be proactive in changing the institutional environment of the 
location where they operate, specifically when instigating corruption. 
Understanding corruption at the firm level and how likely managers are to engage in it has 
not yet been fully understood, as most studies dealing with entering new foreign locations only 
deal with issues of whether or not to engage in corrupt activities (Doh, et al., 2003; Galang, 2012). 
Though, some companies are being proactive in how they deal with corruption abroad, there is a 
dearth of research dealing with specific approaches that can be used to create strategies to deal 
with this problem. Therefore, we propose to analyse how managers react to high corruption abroad 
when deciding whether or not to invest in such location. In order to do so, we decided to analyse 
how managers from two different home locations (either more or less corrupt than the host country) 
rationalise their plans to enter a foreign location that is characterised by high levels of corruption. 
The rationale for this design is to study whether the strength of the home country institutional 
environment has an effect on engagement in corruption abroad. 
FDI responds differently to various public policies if the host country is considered 
developed or developing (Goodspeed, et al., 2013; Godinez & Garita, 2016). Separating home 
countries based on their quality of institutions can provide a valuable insight into how firms create 
strategies to deal with corruption abroad. Based on this premise, we propose that the level of 
corruption of the home country might also play an important role when allocating FDI in a highly 
corrupt host country. Such differences might steam from knowledge developed at home about 
dealing with corruption and pressures from home constituencies regarding engaging in corrupt 
activities abroad.  
Research Design, Data, and Methods 
In order to analyse how the corruption level of the host country affects the decision-making 
process of FDI allocation, this research utilised a qualitative approach. The qualitative 
methodology was appropriate to generate inferences from the respondents in an inductive manner. 
Furthermore, a qualitative approach was more appropriate for this study since our aim was to 
analyse the perception of corruption and its effects on the decision making process of allocating 
FDI rather than a quantification of such effects. Therefore, to generate the data needed for this 
study we utilised semi-structured interviews. This format was preferred because it allowed us an 
informal setting for questioning to suit the needs of each participant. Also, the semi-structured 
interviews allowed us the flexibility to clarify responses or pursue emergent issues (Bryman, 
2008). 
Setting 
Guatemala was chosen to conduct this study. The reason for using Guatemala as the setting 
for our study is because of its high corruption levels (Transparency International has ranked 
Guatemala in the 123rd place in the world, out of 177 countries) (Transparency International, 
2014). In fact, several members of the Guatemalan government have been facing allegations of 
corruption, which resulted in the resignation and incarceration of the country’s former president 
and vice-president (Malkin, 2015). Despite of Guatemala’s high corruption levels, the country is 
the second largest recipient of FDI in Central America with a GDP of $53.80 billion in 2014 and 
receives the largest amount of FDI in the Central American region, which accounted for $1.308 
billion during the same year (World Bank, 2014). 
The high levels of corruption in Guatemala are explained by its levels of inequality and its 
transition from a lengthy civil war. According to Rose-Ackerman (2008), inequality within a 
nation is a predictor of high corruption. In the case of Guatemala, the United Nations Development 
Programme ranks it as one of the 20 most unequal countries in the world (UNDP, 2009). Also, 
scholars analysing corruption point out that nations transitioning from an internal conflict are 
usually characterised by weak institutions, which are fertile grounds for corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 2008). Thus, due to its levels of corruption and FDI inflows, 
Guatemala is an adequate location to analyse how the corruption level of the host country affects 
the decision-making process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location 
Data Collection 
Data collection took place in two phases: from June to August 2012, and from June to July 
2014. Data was collected by contacting all foreign firms that had invested in Guatemala since 
2007. The reason for contacting these firms was to be able to talk to those individuals who had an 
active participation in the decision-making process of investing in the country. Once all firms were 
contacted, 28 firms agreed to allow us to interview managers who were involved in the decision 
regarding investment in a highly corrupt foreign location. The interviews were semi-structured in 
order to increase the focus and depth of the issue at hand.  The interviewees had the choice of 
being interviewed in English or Spanish by the lead author. Those interviews conducted in Spanish 
were translated to English and then back to Spanish to corroborate their accuracy. Each interview 
lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and followed standard protocols to capture emerging themes in 
field research (Strauss & Corbin, 1994), and was recorded and transcribed.  
After the first round of interviews (6 interviews), we decided to focus our data collection 
on a small number of steps used in the process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt host location. 
To do this, a theoretical sampling was applied (Denzin, 1989), which is recommended for 
analytical induction (Bansal & Roth, 2000) in order to identify such steps. This approach was taken 
in order to capture a broad set of beliefs and practices during the decision-making process of 
allocating FDI to a corrupt location within the sample. In this manner, we followed Mair, et al., 
(2012) who propose to use the cases to arrange and stimulate data analysis, instead of using them 
as a method to expose variance.  
After analysing the preliminary results of the first six interviews, five main steps were 
identified as the main process used by managers to invest in a highly corrupt foreign location. The 
investor’s characteristics depending on the corruption level of their home country (more or less 
corrupt than the host country); previous knowledge of dealing with corruption; perception of 
corruption; uncertainty created by corruption distance; and strategy to deal with corruption. Once 
these areas of interest were identified, 22 additional interviews were conducted. Together with the 
first round of interviews, the data gathered was then used in a repetitive manner to compare 
information across informants and to analyse important points of synergy (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
Analysis 
The data was analysed in two phases in order to go back and forth between emerging 
theoretical arguments and the data, following Mair et al., (2012). Before any analysis, a narrative 
account of findings was arranged in a chronological manner. The historical account revealed a 
method to arrange the data around the steps utilised to invest in a highly corrupt host location. The 
qualitative analysis was carried out with the help of NVivo 9.0. The first six interviews included 
three from investors located in home countries with higher corruption levels than the host country 
and three from less corrupt host countries. In this manner, we developed a code system that allowed 
us to understand how the level of corruption of the home country affected the process of investing 
in a highly corrupt host location. After the data was collected, it was subjected to a manifest 
analysis of the condensed narratives, following Berg (2004). The analysis was carried out by 
identifying phrases commonly employed by the respondents, then by identifying justified 
descriptions. Based on these analyses we were able to examine how the difference in corruption 
levels of the home and host country affected the decision-making process of allocating FDI to a 
highly corrupt host country. 
 The first stage of formal analysis consisted of corroborating whether there were differences 
between how interviewees saw and responded to corruption based on the corruption level of their 
home country as compared to that of the host location with open coding. In order to carry out this 
stage, we relied on institutional theory that proposes that firms will seek legitimacy by conforming 
to their social context (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). Nevertheless, gaining legitimacy is a difficult 
process due to the different institutional environments in which such firms operate (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). However, the data corroborated that those firms headquartered in countries with 
high levels of corruption were able to achieve legitimacy in a highly corrupt host country since 
such institutional environment resembled that of their home country. On the contrary, those firms 
located in countries with low corruption levels had a more difficult time adapting to the 
institutional environment of a host country characterised by high corruption levels. 
 The second stage of formal data analysis centred on investigating how managers 
rationalised their investment decision in a highly corrupt host country in relation to the two 
identified home countries, either more or less corrupt than the host country. The emphasis was 
placed on the remaining four steps of allocating FDI, even though it would have been possible to 
identify a greater number of activities. The rationale for focusing on these steps is because during 
the analysis, it became apparent that these areas were consistently emerging from all the 
interviews. Therefore, the decision was made to carry an extensive analysis of these steps. The 
analysis in this stage was carried out by creating provisional categories and first-code orders (Van 
Maanen, 1979). With the help of NVivo 9.0, it was possible to maintain a record of emerging 
categories and to see comparable coded texts concurrently, which was useful to manage the large 
dataset. Following Miles and Huberman (1994), the first categorical codes offered labels for 
different activities. The codes were created to mirror the words used by the interviewees, which 
included, for example, “being used to dealing with corruption,” “problems associated with 
corruption,” and “being prepared to deal with corruption.”  
 After analysing the first order of codes, an axial coding was utilised (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994). The second order of codes was used to provide meaning to how respondents rationalised 
their process of understanding corruption and creating a process to allocate FDI in a highly corrupt 
host country. In this procedure, an inductive process was utilised to identify a more abstract and 
theory rich construct of the data. In this stage, the data gathered and analysed was used to 
understand how managers allocated FDI to a highly corrupt host location and to provide the 
theoretical implications of this process.     
 
Results and Discussion 
This study explores how corruption affects the decision-making process of FDI allocation. 
The analysis is comprised by the experiences and views of managers who had a direct role in 
deciding whether or not to invest in a highly corrupt foreign location, their previous experience 
and preconceived conceptions of corruption, and the conceptual and practical steps involved in 
minimising the effects of corruption when investing abroad, as presented in Figure 1. This section 
presents an analysis and decision-making model of allocating FDI in a highly corrupt host country. 
The results in this section emphasise the importance of the corruption level of the country where 
firms are headquartered when creating strategies to deal with corruption abroad.   
Investors Characteristics 
The characteristics of respondents for this analysis are presented in Table 1. The names of 
respondents and MNEs are not shared to protect the identity of the participants due to the sensitive 
nature of this research. All respondents represent MNEs operating in the services industry. In other 
words, all the investments made in the host country can be classified as market-seeking. The 
respondents were identified as members of an MNE that had recently (within the last five years) 
established operations in Guatemala. Respondents also had to have actively participated in the 
decision-making process of investing and subsequent operations in the host country. As previously 
mentioned, the respondents were divided into two groups: MNEs headquartered in countries with 
lower levels of corruption than the host country and MNEs headquartered in countries with higher 
corruption levels than the host country. This distinction was made in order to compare how 
corruption abroad affects those foreign investors that are familiar with corruption at home 
compared to those without such experience. Also, the corruption distance and direction between 
the home and host country is provided, as well as the number of other subsidiaries in Latin 
America. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Previous knowledge of dealing with corruption 
After conducting all the interviews with managers of firms with higher levels of corruption 
than the host country, it was evident that all of them had extensive experience with dealing with 
corruption. This experience was developed when operating in their home country as well as in 
other countries that had corruption levels similar to that of the home country. However, not all of 
them acquired such experience in the same manner. For instance, Investor 1 argued that 
“knowledge of how to deal with corrupt officials can be acquired at home.” This view was 
supported by investors 2, 4, 7, 8, and 14, and supports previous claims that firms can learn to 
operate in challenging environments and deploy such knowledge abroad, as proposed by Buckley, 
et al., (2007) and Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008).  
All investors from home countries with higher corruption levels than the host country 
agreed that they acquired knowledge of how to deal with corruption at home. However, some of 
them did so implicitly (See Table 2 for a summary of illustrative comments from respondents). An 
example of this is Investor 10, who stated that “nothing can fully prepare you to deal with 
corruption abroad; but, after having operations in the country you learn what to expect.” Investor 
3 had a similar view to Investor 10, claiming that “no one can totally learn how to deal with 
corruption at home or abroad. But, the experience at home taught us where we should expect illegal 
claims.” In a similar view, Investor 8 argued that “there is no need to know how to deal with 
corruption. You should learn to deal with people of different customs and that experience can be 
acquired at home.”  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of responses from managers headquartered in countries with 
lower corruption levels than the host country when asked about acquiring knowledge to deal with 
corruption with varied responses. In this sense, many foreign investors argued that corruption is 
an important problem that is severely punished at home, even if the corrupt act is committed 
abroad. Thus, according to these investors (Investors, 18, 20, 23, and 26), they did not have the 
opportunity to learn how to deal with corruption either at home or in the other foreign locations 
where they operate. On the other hand, other investors from countries with lower corruption levels 
than Guatemala (Investors 15, 19, 22, 24, and 25), argued that corruption although bad, can be 
seen as a “means to an end.” It is plausible that these investors argue for a more benign nature of 
corruption, since the corruption levels of their home countries are close to those of Guatemala, 
according to Transparency International (Transparency International, 2014). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
From an institutional theory point of view, these findings mean that the level of corruption 
of the host country, as compared to that of the home country, matters when analysing FDI flows 
to a highly corrupt host location. This finding validates, at the firm-level with a qualitative 
approach, the results proposed by Goodspeed et al., (2013). Also, these results suggest managers 
can develop the capacity to operate in a particular institutional environment (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). Managers, in this sense, generate assumptions that influence how their firms operate in an 
external environment and are able to deploy them in similar foreign environments. In the case of 
MNEs headquartered in highly corrupt countries this means that a foreign environment that can be 
considered as ‘challenging’ by some managers, cannot be considered as such if a manager had the 
opportunity to learn how to operate in it at home. On the other hand, firms located in home 
countries with low corruption levels might face considerable problems achieving legitimacy in a 
foreign environment characterised by high corruption. The difficulties to achieve legitimacy arise 
from the complexity of the different institutional environments in which an MNE operates 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). When talking about a firm operating in a highly corrupt host country, 
this means that MNEs without knowledge of how to operate in such conditions might have 
difficulties assessing their critical constituencies (Scott, 1995) and might face strong pressures at 
home to not engage in corruption abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Perception of corruption and engagement in corruption abroad 
Responses from MNEs headquartered in home countries with higher levels of corruption 
than the host country agreed that corruption was a problem. For example, Investor 1 declared that 
“corruption is morally wrong.” Other respondents argued that corruption is one of the most 
important problems they have to face when deciding to start operations in a foreign location and 
to continue their activities in such places (Investors 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12). These responses are 
in line with the general view that corruption has a negative effect on businesses (Doh, et al., 2003; 
Wei, 1997). Nonetheless, twelve respondents, out of fourteen, justified the existence of corruption. 
In this sense, respondents argued that even though corruption is detrimental for their businesses, 
they had to comply with it to remain in businesses. For instance, Investor 9 argued that “corruption 
is wrong but if I do not comply, we go out of business and we cannot offer employment.” This 
view was echoed by all respondents as summarised in Table 4, except Investors 2 and 7, who 
declared that “corruption should not exist” and that “firms should not engage in it.” 
Despite their negative views on corruption, all fourteen respondents from MNEs based on 
countries with higher levels of corruption than the host country, admitted to have had participated 
in corrupt deals abroad. In fact, to some degree, all respondents agreed that corruption was just 
part of doing business in Guatemala. Investor 4 is a good example of this finding by declaring that 
“if we wanted to be awarded contracts, we had to participate in corrupt deals”. Investor 13 also 
said that “we had no choice but to comply with the local customs.” This result might confirm that 
those foreign investors based in highly corrupt home countries might internalise knowledge of how 
to deal with corruption at home and deploy it abroad. Also, this finding shows that foreign investors 
from countries with high levels of corruption are aware that corruption is wrong but they choose 
to engage in it nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 4. Thus, this result may indicate that those 
MNEs headquartered in home countries with high levels of corruption might not face pressures 
from stakeholders at home to not engage in corrupt deals abroad. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
When talking to respondents from MNEs headquartered in countries with lower levels of 
corruption than the host country, it was evident that they also saw corruption as an important 
problem. Out of fourteen respondents, nine argued that corruption was detrimental for their 
businesses and for society in general. However, these investors disagreed on how much of a 
problem corruption really was. For example, Investor 20 declared that “corruption is a cancer of a 
society.” Investor 16, on the other hand, argued that “corruption is a major impediment for 
conducting business abroad but it is not the only factor to be considered.” Nevertheless, all 
respondents declared that corruption was detrimental for their businesses and that it even decreased 
the amount of investment allocated in a foreign location. 
The main difference between MNEs headquartered in countries with lower level of 
corruption than the host country, and those with higher corruption levels, was that those MNEs 
with low levels of corruption at home were less likely to engage in corruption abroad, as presented 
in Table 5. According to investors 18, 20, 21, 23, and 26, they not only have regulations at home 
preventing them from engaging in corruption overseas but also internal policies to minimise the 
risk of engaging on corrupt deals abroad. Also, investors 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 25, and 27 declared 
that they too “try to avoid” corrupt deals abroad when possible. An example of how foreign 
investors try to avoid corruption abroad was provided by Investor 27 who said that when it is 
necessary, they rely on their local partners to carry out certain operations that might not be 
perceived as totally ethical. This finding confirms the long held idea that corruption has a negative 
effect on MNEs. However, the negative effect of corruption on a business might be even more 
detrimental if the MNE is headquartered in a country with lower levels of corruption than the host 
country. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The results of the perception of corruption depending on the corruption level of the home 
country as compared to that of the host country, means that the location where a manager spent 
his/her formative years has a direct influence on how such manager views corruption. Institutional 
theory has been utilised to understand how organisational structures and processes become 
institutionalised over time (Oliver, 1991). The fundamental premise of this theory is that MNEs 
have tendencies to conform to predominant norms and traditions of the location in which they 
operate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In turn, such tendencies lead to a homogeneity amongst the 
structures of an MNE and its activities, that is shaped by social pressures (Oliver, 1997). In the 
case of corruption, it means that a manager’s perception of corruption is directly linked to the 
corruption level of their home country.  
Uncertainty created by corruption distance  
Corruption can be seen as a tax on MNEs (Mauro, 1995), but the greatest challenge it poses 
on firms might not be the costs themselves, but the uncertainty regarding the actual costs that the 
firm will need to pay to a corrupt foreign official (Wei, 1997).  While previous studies agree that 
the uncertainty created by corruption might be more detrimental to foreign investors than the actual 
corruption level (Curevo-Cazurra, 2008; Fisman & Miguel, 2007), little is known about how such 
uncertainty affects the decision-making process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt host country. 
In this research, the majority of respondents of MNEs based in countries with high levels of 
corruption agreed that uncertainty was not a characteristic of the Guatemalan market. According 
to these investors, they had previous knowledge of the corruption levels of the host country and 
how to manoeuvre through it. When asked a question regarding uncertainty, Investor 3 replied that 
“no one is surprised about the levels of corruption in Guatemala.” To further this point, Investor 8 
argued that its firm “knows how to do business where they decide to operate.” This sentiment was 
shared by investors 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11. However, even though most investors based in home 
countries with high levels of corruption declared that the uncertainty created by corruption was 
minimal in Guatemala, they agreed that corruption had detrimental consequences. According to 
Investor 7, “the uncertainty created by corruption was minimal but it did increase their operating 
costs.” This finding, illustrated in Table 6, is in line with the conclusions reached by Cuervo-
Cazurra (2008) and Uhlenbruck, et al., (2006) who argued that the levels of arbitrariness of 
corruption are more detrimental to foreign investors than its levels of pervasiveness. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
In general, respondents from MNEs headquartered in countries with lower levels of 
corruption than the host country declared that they had knowledge that Guatemala’s was 
considered highly corrupt. Nevertheless, the uncertainty it created when deciding how to operate 
in the country was a great impediment for doing businesses there (Collins, et al., 2008), as 
presented in Table 7. In this study, nine respondents (out of fourteen) argued that uncertainty 
generated by corruption was a concern when deciding to start operations in Guatemala. These 
respondents also voiced that uncertainty was an obstacle to operate in a highly corrupt host country. 
In fact, respondents 15, 17, 19, and 20 argued that local officials in Guatemala can request 
unlimited bribes. Other respondents, such as Investors 16, 17, 25, and 28, agreed that the costs 
associated with corruption in Guatemala were predictable, and hence, uncertainty generated by 
corruption was minimal.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Corruption is distinct in different countries in both the reach throughout the economy 
(Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006), and the uncertainty it creates (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013). A host 
locations characterised by high uncertainty derived from corruption might require several 
ineffectual corrupt transactions from foreign firms. Moreover, under a weak administrative 
governance, government officials might be willing to change the set of necessary approvals 
without giving notice to receive maximal bribes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Therefore, firms 
without previous knowledge of how to deal with corruption might suffer negative effects when 
operating in a foreign location characterised by high uncertainty created by corruption. However, 
this study finds that the uncertainty created by high corruption has detrimental effects on foreign 
investors when such investors are located in countries with low levels of corruption.  
Furthermore, such negative effects are exacerbated with a higher corruption distance 
between the home and host countries. On the other hand, corruption distance appears to not have 
an effect on firms located in a home country that has higher corruption levels than an already 
highly corrupt host location. This finding is explained because such firms have been equipped with 
developed knowledge regarding operating in highly corrupt countries, and are able to deploy such 
knowledge to operate abroad. Also, this finding can be explained because firms located in a highly 
corrupt home country might not face strong pressures to not engage in corruption abroad from 
home country stakeholders. 
Strategic measures to deal with corruption abroad 
Most studies analysing corruption and FDI agree that corruption has a negative effect to 
various degrees on foreign investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Doh et al., 2003; Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002). In addition to market avoidance, mutational enterprises have made great efforts 
to explore different ways to lessen the sensitivity of the affects and to engage in FDI activities (for 
example, trading favours).  However, fewer studies have analysed strategic responses of MNEs 
when the decision of investing abroad has been made. To address this gap in the literature, Luiz 
and Stewart (2014) argue that some firms have created anti-corruption policies with strict anti-
corruption participation mandates even though the authors argue that for some companies, 
sometimes participating in corrupt deals is unavoidable. Building on their work, this study shows 
that there is a great difference between MNEs based in countries with low levels of corruption and 
MNEs based in highly corrupt countries, when talking about strategies to deal with corruption 
abroad. In general, MNEs based in home countries with high corruption levels do not have formal 
strategies to deal with corruption abroad. Of the fourteen MNEs studied, only four declared to have 
a strategy to deal with corruption abroad (Investors 1, 2, 5, and 6). Nevertheless, their strategy was 
to allocate resources to their budget to pay for bribes. Therefore, while these investors describe 
themselves as proactive, they are still participating in corrupt deals abroad, as exemplified in Table 
8. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
The responses from MNEs based in countries with lower levels of corruption than the host 
country showed that in general these firms have strategies to deal with corruption abroad (Table 
2). In line with Luiz and Stewart (2014) Investors 15, 16, 18, and 20 declared that their main 
strategy to deal with corruption was avoidance. These investors argued that they avoided 
conducting business with the local government when possible. Other respondents went further and 
declared that their organisational structure was designed to be as transparent as possible (Investors 
21, 23, 24, and 25). These investors declared that they had the mandate from headquarters to adhere 
to a strict code of conduct, as Table 9 illustrates. Such code of conduct required that all negotiations 
with local government officials and/or business partners be recorded and attended by at least two 
members of the MNE. Moreover, these investors argued that they had clear transparency 
procedures in place to hire suppliers. However, there were investors that declared not to have 
strategic measures in place to deal with corruption abroad (Investors 17, 22, and 28), which might 
be because their levels of corruption, although lower than Guatemala, can still be considered high. 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
Another approach used by firms from less corrupt countries when investing in Guatemala, 
was to have a decentralised approach. While some investors declared that their strategy to deal 
with corruption was to avoid it, others argued that they preferred their strategy to have some “room 
for interpretation” to account for variations in the host countries where they operate. This approach 
was put in place to adhere to the host country’s local norms, such as the acceptance of hospitality. 
Nevertheless, these firms also had a high transparency requirement that made it necessary for 
managers to record and report all gifts received when conducting businesses there. Table 10 
presents a summary of the main findings of this study 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 
Conclusions 
This study analysed how the corruption level of the host country affects the decision-
making process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location. Based on institutional theory 
this study analysed two kinds of corruption, public and organisational (Luiz & Stewart, 2014), and 
how such corruption affects MNEs investing in a highly corrupt foreign location. In order to 
answer the question, 28 interviews were carried out with managers of MNEs that had recently 
invested in Guatemala. Following the work of Godinez and Liu (2015), we divided the respondents 
into two groups: MNEs headquartered in countries with higher corruption levels than the host 
country, and MNEs headquartered in countries with lower corruption levels than the host country. 
The classification of home countries as either more or less corrupt than the host country was made 
to compare and contrast reactions to corruption abroad based on the experience foreign investors 
had at home regarding how to deal with corruption and if such experience could be utilised abroad 
(Goodspeed et al., 2013). The results show that firms based in home countries with lower levels 
of corruption than Guatemala were negatively affected by corruption in the host country. On the 
other hand, those MNEs based in home countries with higher levels of corruption than the host 
country were not as negatively affected when investing in a foreign country characterised by high 
levels of corruption. 
Corruption is believed to have negative effects on economic growth (Halkos & Tzeremes, 
2010). Corruption acts like a tax. Firms devote resources to manage corruption but those resources 
could be better allocated (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Corruption is also believed to have a negative 
effect on foreign investors (Godinez & Garita, 2015). However, building on the foundation that 
not all foreign investors are equal (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), we argue that those foreign investors 
based in home countries with lower levels of corruption than the host country might not be as 
likely to engage in corruption abroad. On the other hand, those investors from MNEs based in 
countries with high levels of corruption might be more likely to participate in corrupt deals in 
foreign locations.  While studies analysing corruption and its effects on FDI have seen MNEs as 
institutional takers (Luiz and Stewart, 2014), we argue that MNEs can actually be more influential 
in the institutional arrangement of a foreign location than previously thought. We base this 
conclusion on the fact that those MNEs familiar with dealing with corruption at home can actually 
seek out other corrupt countries to establish new operations. On the other hand, those firms based 
in countries with low levels of corruption might try to avoid engaging in corruption abroad and 
actually have policies to ensure they operate corruption free abroad.   
Finally, while firms should have strategies to deal with corruption (Luiz and Stewart, 
2013), this study found, however, that those MNEs from countries with higher levels of corruption 
than the host country did not have strategies in place to deal with corruption abroad. Respondents 
from these firms argued that corruption was just a part of doing business and that no specific 
strategies were needed. On the other hand, those firms located in countries with lower corruption 
levels than Guatemala attributed their success in the country to their strategies to deal with the 
country’s corruption. These investors argued that their strategies to deal with corruption included 
a clear policy to avoid doing businesses with the local government, as well as a well-designed 
organisational structure that allowed transparency.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This study has many limitations. Due to the qualitative nature of this analysis we were able 
to study in depth how corruption affects the decision-making process of allocating FDI to a corrupt 
foreign location. However, qualitative studies rely on a restricted number of respondents. For this 
reason, future studies should analyse this issue in a quantitative manner, and hopefully with more 
than one host country. This approach is necessary to develop testable hypotheses that can further 
our knowledge of the subject. Also, due to the large levels of corruption present in Guatemala, the 
number of home countries with higher corruption levels than the host country is limited. 
Lastly, even though this study argues that those MNEs headquartered in countries with 
high corruption levels might not be negatively affected by corruption when investing and operating 
abroad, it is important to note that corruption is still a problem that affects them. As stated by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), resources allocated to dealing and complying with corruption could 
be more effectively and efficiently deployed to more productive operations. Firms from highly 
corrupt home countries should follow the lead of their counterparts from less corrupt countries and 
think proactively about this problem and how to avoid it. If they do so, they would not only utilise 
their resources more wisely, but they could also gain more goodwill from customers that demand 
higher standards from MNEs.  
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Table 1: Profile of Respondents 
Investor Home Country 
Corruption 
Distance 
and Direction 
Amount Invested in Past 5 
Years (US$) 
No. of Subsidiaries 
in Latin America 
I1 Honduras -3 Up to 1 million 2 
I2 Vietnam -1 Between 10 and 20 million 6 
I3 Guyana -2 Between 5 and 10 million 4 
I4 Honduras -3 Up to 1 million 3 
I5 Vietnam -1 Between 5 and 10 million 4 
I6 Venezuela -13 Between 5 and 10 million 5 
I7 Nicaragua -4 Between 10 and 20 million 8 
I8 Honduras -3 Between 5 and 10 million 4 
I9 Russia -5 Up to 1 million 3 
I10 Paraguay -8 Between 5 and 10 million 4 
I11 Russia -5 Between 1 and 5 million 3 
I12 Turkmenistan -15 Between 10 and 20 million 6 
I13 Nicaragua -4 Up to 1 million 2 
I14 Nicaragua -4 Between 1 and 5 million 3 
I15 China 4 Between 10 and 20 million 5 
I16 Canada 49 Between 10 and 20 million 7 
I17 Mexico 3 Between 20 and 30 million 9 
I18 USA 42 Between 30 and 40 million 7 
I19 Mexico 3 Between 5 and 10 million 5 
I20 Canada 49 Between 20 and 30 million 8 
I21 Germany 47 Between 10 and 20 million 6 
I22 China 4 Between 30 and 40 million 10 
I23 USA 42 Between 5 and 10 million 4 
I24 China 4 Between 20 and 30 million 6 
I25 Spain 28 Between 10 and 20 million 6 
I26 USA 42 Between 30 and 40 million 7 
I27 Germany 47 Between 10 and 20 million 6 
I28 Spain 28 Between 5 and 10 million 4 
 Figure 1: Corruption and how it affects the decision-making process of allocating FDI 
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TABLE 2: Knowledge of dealing with corruption from managers headquartered in countries with 
higher corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I1 Of course knowledge of how to deal with corrupt officials 
can be acquired at home. We learned what corrupt officials 
want and how we can provide it. In this manner we ensure 
that we can remain in business 
I2 If you think of it, Vietnam and Guatemala aren't that 
different. Businesses want to operate and government 
workers want to supplement their income. In this sense, 
we have plenty of practice at home of how to help both 
parties reach their goals 
I3 Corruption is different in different places. This means that 
no one can totally learn how to deal with corruption at 
home or abroad. But, the experience at home taught us 
where we should expect illegal claims and how to deal 
with them 
I4 At home [Honduras] we have been dealing with corrupt 
officials since we started our business. That experience has 
definitely helped us operating abroad. We learned very 
early that there are certain expectations for businesses to 
be able to secure contracts and acquire licenses, for 
example 
I7 Yes, we have had to deal with many corrupt public 
officials at home. This experience gave us enough practice 
to know how to maneuver corrupt officials abroad, 
especially since our countries are very similar 
I8 Government officials are the same everywhere. We had 
the chance to learn to deal with them at home and we 
realized that officials abroad aren't that different 
I9 Companies should not be too worried about learning to 
deal with corruption. Instead, they should learn how to 
deal with people of different customs and that experience 
can be acquired at home 
I10 Nothing can fully prepare you to deal with corruption 
abroad; but, after having operations in the country, you 
learn what to expect and how to deal with different 
requests 
I14 We have had to learn to collaborate with corrupt officials 
at home. They have a goal and we have ours. It is the same 
in other countries.  
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Table 3: Knowledge of dealing with corruption from managers headquartered in countries with 
lower corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I15 We had adapted to co-exist with corruption. Sometimes 
we have to comply but we try not to 
I18 Absolutely not. Of course there is corruption at home but 
nothing even close than Guatemala 
 
I19 We try to avoid doing corrupt deals as much as we can 
even though sometimes it is difficult, especially with low 
level officials asking for small bribes 
 
I20 I am sure there is corruption at home but we have a zero 
tolerance policy at home and abroad 
 
I22 Corruption at home is not uncommon. However, 
due to cultural differences I do not believe that 
corruption at home helped cope with corruption in  
Guatemala 
 
I23 Not interested in learning 
 
I24 We had learned to maneuver in conditions considered less  
than ideal 
I25 You could learn to deal with corruption if you wanted to. 
Either learn to engage on it or how to avoid it 
 
I26 No, at home it is known that there is corruption in 
government contracts but we do not participate in those 
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Table 4: Perception of corruption and engagement in corruption abroad from managers 
headquartered in countries with higher corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I1 Corruption is morally wrong. However, sometimes it is  
necessary to continue in business 
I2 Corruption is deplorable and should not exist and firms  
should not engage in it. 
I3 Corruption is wrong, but it is understandable since some 
public officials need to complement their wages. 
 
I4 I do not believe that there is such thing as corruption. 
People only have different business cultures and it is our  
job to figure out how to operate in each one 
I5 Corruption is wrong but if I do not comply, I do not have a 
business and cannot offer employment 
 
I6 It should not be acceptable but it is the only way to do 
business sometimes  
 
I7 Corruption is wrong. It should not be acceptable 
 
I8 Corruption is part of doing business anywhere 
 
I9 Corruption should not exist but it does. If we do not 
participate we will go out of business 
 
I11 Corruption is wrong but that is how business is conducted  
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Table 5: Perception of corruption and engagement in corruption abroad from managers 
headquartered in countries with lower corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I18 Corruption is wrong and should be combatted  
 
I19 Corruption is wrong and delays processes 
 
I20 Corruption is a cancer of a society 
 
I21 Corruption is morally wrong and affects an entire society 
 
I22 Corruption increases prices and diminishes reputations 
 
I24 Corruption should not exist and business should be 
transparent. That is not always the case 
 
I26 Corruption is illegal at home and anywhere we operate 
 
I28 Corruption is wrong and should not happen, but it does 
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Table 6: Uncertainty created by corruption from managers headquartered in countries with 
higher corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I2 When investing in Guatemala we had knowledge of the 
problem in the country. Uncertainty was minimal  
 
I3 There is no uncertainty due to corruption. No one is 
surprised by corruption in Guatemala 
 
I4 There is no uncertainty if you know what you will 
encounter 
 
I6 There is no uncertainty when you know what to expect 
 
I8 Not uncertain, we know how to do business where we 
operate 
 
I9 Corruption increases prices but we know how to deal with  
it 
I13 Corruption expedites processes but increases prices 
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Table 7: Uncertainty created by corruption from managers headquartered in countries with lower 
corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I16 Corruption occurs more often when doing business with 
the government. We try to avoid that 
 
I17 Corruption in Guatemala is very predictable as well as its  
costs 
I19 Uncertainty can be high but once officials see how we do 
business they do not bother us 
 
I20 We do whatever we can to avoid engaging in corruption 
 
I23 Corruption erodes an organization’s image, increases 
costs, increases poverty 
 
I25 Increases costs and sometimes prevents us from doing 
business with the government (when we refuse to pay) 
 
I26 Corruption worsens poverty, promotes inequality and 
increases costs to everyone 
 
I28 Corruption makes access to permits and contracts more 
difficult. Those with connections have an advantage 
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Table 8: Strategic Measures to deal with corruption abroad from managers headquartered in 
countries with higher corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I1 On our business plan we allocated money for payments to 
local officials 
 
I2 We already knew that several requests were going to be 
made. We had to account for those expenses when 
devising our plan 
 
I3 Our institution does not have a plan to deal with corruption 
abroad, as far as I am concerned 
 
I7 We know how to operate in these kinds of countries. There 
is no need to create formal strategies to do what we 
already know how to do 
 
I13 This company does not have formal norms about dealing 
with corrupt government officials 
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Table 9: Strategic Measures to deal with corruption abroad from managers headquartered in 
countries with lower corruption levels than the host country 
  
Investor 
 
Illustrative Quotes 
 
  
I15 Our main strategy is to avoid doing business with local 
government. If necessary, we hire a local company to do 
deal with them for us 
 
I17 Our company does not have clear strategic measures to 
deal with corruption abroad. We just try to do the right 
thing 
 
I18 Avoid doing business with local government. Clear code 
of conduct applicable to all of our employees 
 
I20 I am not sure if this is considered a strategy, but we have a 
clear code of conduct applicable to all of our employees 
which is zero tolerance to corrupt behavior 
 
I24 If my memory serves me well, we have a petty cash 
budget to deal with small requests mainly from low level 
bureaucrats 
I26 We follow the code of conduct when doing business 
abroad in place by our firm. We also exercise our 
discretion always acting ethically 
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TABLE 10: Summary of Findings 
Characteristics 
Previous Knowledge 
of 
Dealing with 
Corruption 
Perception of  
Corruption 
Uncertainty Created  
by 
Corruption Distance 
Strategy to Deal 
with 
Corruption 
Abroad 
     
More Corrupt 
Generally acquired in 
the home country.  
Also acquired in other 
locations resembling  
home country  
institutional 
Environment 
An important  
problem but 
"justifiable" 
Corruption in the  
host country generates 
minimal uncertainty 
Generally, no 
strategy in place. 
Only "strategy" 
allocate 
bribing money to  
the budget 
     
Less Corrupt 
Difficult to acquire 
knowledge at home.  
Also, home country 
formal and informal  
pressures to not  
engage in corruption 
abroad 
A very important 
problem that 
needs 
to be eradicated 
Corruption in the  
host country 
generates great 
uncertainty 
Avoiding dealing 
with 
government 
officials. 
Codes of conduct. 
Understanding 
differences 
in culture but with  
transparency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
